The Examiner

NTSB Unable to Explain Driver’s Decision in Valhalla Train Crash

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The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the driver of an SUV caused the Feb. 3, 2015 accident at the Commerce Street grade crossing in Valhalla. The driver, Ellen Brody, and five train passengers were killed.

Federal investigators were unable to definitively conclude why an SUV driver moved into the path of an oncoming train Metro-North train at the Commerce Street grade crossing in Valhalla more than two years ago.

On Tuesday, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) convened in Washington to release its highly anticipated final report into the deadly accident that killed the driver of the Mercedes SUV, Ellen Brody, and five passengers aboard the first car of the northbound Harlem line train.

Safety recommendations from the NTSB were also issued following release of the report aimed at railroad operators, including Metro-North, in addition to the New York State Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Town of Mount Pleasant.

Probable cause of the Feb. 3, 2015, accident was Brody, a 49-year-old Edgemont resident, driving into the path of the train, likely the result of a variety of factors, including possible confusion when the grade crossing arm lowered and struck the roof of her vehicle. Investigators during the NTSB meeting stated that Brody reduced the amount of time she had to move her car out of danger when she exited her vehicle to inspect what happened.

However, there was insufficient evidence for NTSB staff to explain her actions despite various theories discussed by the board and staff.

“The (NTSB) determines that probable cause of the accident was the driver of the sport utility vehicle, for undetermined reasons, moving the vehicle onto the tracks while the Commerce Street railroad grade crossing system was activated, into the path of the Metro-North Railroad train 659,” the finding stated in part.

The report also stated that contributing to the accident’s severity and the passengers’ deaths in the train’s front car was how 343 feet of live third rail was dislodged after the train engineer activated the emergency brake. Investigators found that the rail punctured the underside of the lead train car, sparking spot fires and blocking some of the exits for passengers.

Lead investigator Michael Hiller said there was exhaustive examination into why Brody chose to move forward after re-entering her car. The crossing’s warning system had been activated 39 seconds before the train reached the crossing, signaling its imminent arrival. Warnings of at least 35 seconds are recommended, according to federal safety guidelines.

“There was a lot of effort, a considerable amount of research done to try to understand the mindset of the driver,” Hiller said. “In situations, situational awareness, stress, there was no evidence available for the investigators and staff to make a determination on the driver’s condition.”

What is known, according to the investigative team, was that Brody left her job at a Chappaqua jewelry store and was headed for an appointment with a client in Scarsdale. She was traveling southbound on the Taconic Parkway when an accident forced traffic in the right lane to be detoured onto Lakeview Avenue. Brody followed the detour to Commerce Street, where she presumably would attempt to make a right turn to head southbound again on the parkway, but remain in the left lane to continue to her destination.

According to witnesses, the traffic was inching along as vehicles were approaching the Commerce Street grade crossing at about 6:25 p.m.

NTSB Acting Chairman Robert Sumwalt said he has repeatedly thought about what may have motivated Brody to move forward since he arrived at the scene the day following the accident. He said many drivers when they are in traffic move forward when the car in front moves forward and Brody, therefore, may have lost “situational awareness.”

“I certainly don’t believe that she thought she was on a railroad track or close to a railroad track, and I believe that because when the gate came down and hit her car, she got out, went to the back of the car and touched it like ‘Where did this come from’”? Sumwalt said.

Hiller said his team found that neither Brody nor the train operator had been impaired by fatigue or drugs or alcohol or distracted by using a cell phone.

In addition to the properly functioning warning system, it was found that the operation of the train and protocols also adhered to safety guidelines. The intersection was found to have proper signage and markings.

According to the testimony at Tuesday’s NTSB meeting, the train was traveling at 59 miles per hour before the engineer noticed something in the crossing. The speed limit is 60 miles per hour on that stretch of track. When the operator noticed the object, the train’s horn was blasted 1,424 feet before the crossing, 16.5 seconds before reaching the car. Fifteen to 20 seconds is standard in that situation. The emergency brake was activated about 350 feet before the crossing. The train was traveling at 51 miles per hour upon impact.

Hiller said train operators pull the emergency brake as a last resort because at full speed it can cause derailments and the possibility of serious damage and injuries.

Had Brody done nothing, the car would have still likely been hit but causing much less damage, Hiller said. Her model of SUV was 15 feet and 8 inches long and 17 feet separates the grade crossing arm and the rail. The train extends about three feet over the rail in each direction, he said.

The investigation lasted nearly two and a half years, about twice as long as originally anticipated because of two other incidents that diverted investigators: a Washington Metro train that filled with smoke killing one commuter and injuring dozens three weeks earlier, and the crash of an Amtrak train in Philadelphia three months later.

Safety Recommendations

The NTSB recommended risk assessments be performed by all rail operators throughout the United States, including Metro-North, evaluating the use of third rails at or near grade crossings.

It also asked the New York State DOT study all of its highway-train grade crossings and for the Town of Mount Pleasant, which completed a study last year to follow through on those recommendations. The town’s study of the Commerce Street intersection concluded that the crossing should be closed and that surrounding roads would be able to handle the diverted traffic.

Sumwalt said regardless of the situation, drivers have the responsibility to remain safe.

“The ultimate risk is at the hands of the driver because the next train is always coming,” he said. “We hope that these safety recommendations are acted on at grade crossings to prevent tragedies in the future.”

 

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